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COMMENT ON DUNFEE
A.A. SOMMER, JR.*
Professor Dunfee has done a singularly competent job in elucidating one of
the recognized exceptions to the general proposition that, in the words of § 2.01
of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations, “a corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and share1
holder gain.” The exception is that a corporation may take into account ethical considerations even if they adversely affect shareholder value. He has
provided a framework within which managers can make rational—and rationalized—decisions as to when ethical considerations may supersede shareholder
interests.
As the Reporter for the Principles of Corporate Governance remarks,
“[t]here is very little direct authority on the permissibility of taking ethical considerations into account in framing corporate action where doing so might not
2
enhance profits.” This proposition is in many ways more difficult to articulate
than is the exception relating to eleemosynary contributions, which is often
dealt with explicitly in statutes.
The proposition that the managers of the corporation (executives and directors) have a primary and almost all-encompassing obligation to maximize
shareholder value is one that many find difficult to accept. The debate is not a
new one, and it did not start with the famous Berle-Dodd dust-up in the early
1930s. The seeds of this controversy had their origins in the very beginnings of
the corporate form of economic enterprise. The earliest corporations, while
they were generally organized by private citizens, nonetheless existed because
of royal or parliamentary largesse, and, while they were permitted and often
encouraged to make a profit from their activities, they were also adjured to
serve some public purpose, such as the operation of a toll road, the provision of
essential supplies, and so on.
Charting the limits for a manager in giving heed to ethical considerations is
difficult. Separating out the manager’s personal ethical instincts from those
that should properly animate him as an official of the corporation is not an easy
task. What one manager may perceive as “marketplace morality,” even a
“hypernorm,” may appear differently in the eyes of another manager. The amCopyright  2000 by A.A. Sommer, Jr.
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biguities are amply demonstrated in the examples that accompany the articulation of the general principle in section 2.01 of the Principles of Corporate Governance. In several instances, a set of hypothetical facts is stated, and conflicting conclusions are both justified under the principles set forth in the “black
3
letter” principle.
A recognition that a corporation and its management may depart from
strict adherence to the profit-making purpose of the corporation opens up a
large area of discretion for management. In a day when homelessness is a pervasive problem, it is easy to rationalize a substantial corporate commitment to
easing the plight of the homeless. Such activity might be linked to making the
community a more desirable place in which to live; that rationalization could
easily mask simple sentimentality and the sympathy of a corporate official for
the underprivileged.
Professor Dunfee would like his conclusions regarding the appropriate impact of moral considerations upon corporate decisionmaking to stand alone and
not depend upon any corporate benefit deriving from adherence to community
ethical perceptions. However, not infrequently in his article the corporate
benefit—or detriment—creeps in. This is not inappropriate. The corporation
flouting the prevailing ethical mindset in a community might very well suffer in
its business. Corporate executives are probably more sensitive than they have
ever been to the impact public opinion can have on their business. Newspapers, radio, television, and now the Internet make the dissemination of information about corporate conduct instantaneous and provide the mechanisms for
mobilizing opinion and action quickly. Thus, what might in other days have
been seen as an ethical response may simply be today’s “good business.” For
example, the action of Johnson & Johnson in promptly withdrawing Tylenol
when the first information of tampering appeared was unquestionably a highly
ethical decision. However, it also proved to be a sound business decision in its
ultimate effect on the Tylenol business.
Today, the public expects businesses, regardless of the form in which they
conduct their affairs, to be sensitive to the hazards their conduct may pose to
the public. However, management cannot always accede to community sentiment, which will often be selfishly protective of parochial interests. Thus, while
the prevailing “ethical” conviction in a community may be that a corporation
should provide generous severance pay for people whose employment ends
when a plant is shut down, rarely will management be as generous as the community would wish. Going further, in such a situation, the prevailing
“marketplace morality” might suggest the plant should remain open, even
though it was incurring potentially ruinous losses.
In the Principles of Corporate Governance’s articulation of the “ethical” exception to the general principle of enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain, a somewhat different and ambiguous notion is introduced. It states that

3. See id. cmt. h, illus. 11-12, cmt. i, illus. 13-14.
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the corporation “[m]ay take into account ethical considerations that are rea4
sonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business.” As
explained in the comment,
[t]his does not mean that corporate officials can properly take into account any ethical consideration, no matter how idiosyncratic. Because such officials are dealing
with other people’s money, they will act properly in taking ethical principles into account only where those considerations are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the
responsible conduct of business. In this connection, however, it should be recognized
that new principles may emerge over time. A corporate official therefore should be
permitted to take into account emerging ethical principles, reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, that have significant support although less-than-universal acceptance.5

The commentary recognizes the difference between officials’ ethical principles and those that relate to the company’s business: “If . . . it appears that an
action that would be in the corporation’s best economic interests would violate
the official’s personal ethical principles, but not ethical principles reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, the official’s
course would normally be either to take that action or to not participate in the
6
decision.”
It is noteworthy that whatever ethical obligations a corporation may be said
to have, there is no binding necessity that the corporation heed such ethical
considerations.
The recognition that the profit primacy of corporate activity can be tempered by ethical considerations could lead to the “pluralist” notion that the
corporation’s responsibilities and obligations extend to constituencies other
than the shareholders. This would be an unfortunate consequence of Professor
Dunfee’s worthy and learned argument for the principle that corporations may
take into account ethical considerations and would, I think, distort his intention. While Professor Dunfee’s argument could be extended to justify a pluralistic conception of the duties or function of a corporation, there is no indication that it is his purpose or intent to do so.

4. Id. § 2.01(b)(2) (emphasis added).
5. Id. cmt. h.
6. Id.

